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CAPITOL RECORDS, LLC V. ReDIGI, INC.
934 F. SUPP. 2D 640 (S.D.N.Y. 2013)
1. INTRODUCTION

In Capitol Records, LLC v. ReDigi Inc., Capitol Records, LLC
("Capitol") filed suit against ReDigi, Inc. ("ReDigi") for copyright
infringement in violation of the Copyright Act of 1976.' Capitol is
a recording company, and ReDigi is a creator of an online
marketplace for "pre-owned" digital music.2 Capitol alleged
infringement of its exclusive reproduction, distribution,
performance, and display rights when ReDigi allowed digital
music owners to sell their lawfully purchased songs to other users
on its online marketplace.'
ReDigi raised two affirmative
defenses, arguing that the reproduction of the work without
consent was fair use and that the lawful owners of the digital
music were authorized to sell their copies under the first sale
doctrine.'
The District Court of the Southern District of New York ("the
District Court") granted Capitol's motion for partial summary
judgment and denied ReDigi's motion for summary judgment.' At
issue before the District Court was "whether a digital music file,
lawfully made and purchased, may be resold by its owner through
ReDigi under the first sale doctrine."'
The District Court
concluded, "that the first sale defense does not permit sales of
digital music files" by lawful owners on websites.' Consequently,
Capitol's motion for summary judgment on the issues of direct,
contributory, and vicarious infringement was granted.8

1. Capitol Records, LLC v. ReDigi, Inc., 934 F. Supp. 2d 640, 644-645
(S.D.N.Y. March 30, 2013).
2. Id.
3. Id. at 648.
4. Id. at 652.
5. Id. at 648.
6. Id.
7. ReDigi, 934 F. Supp. 2d at 656.
8. Id. at 660-661.
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II. BACKGROUND

A. FactualHistory
ReDigi's website was an online marketplace that allowed users
to sell their lawfully purchased digital music and buy digital music
from other users.' First, a user was required to download an
application called "Media Manager," which sifted through the
user's computer to compile a list of digital music eligible for sale."o
Digital music purchased on iTunes or from another user was
eligible, but digital music from other sharing websites or CD
downloads were not eligible."
The application continued to run on the user's computer and
attached devices to guarantee that the user did not retain a copy of
the digital music file once an appropriate file had been selected for
sale by the user. 2 If a copy was detected, the program prompted
the user to delete the digital music file. But the deletion was not
automatic; it was a voluntary decision of the user." ReDigi's
policy was to suspend the user's account if the user refused to
comply with the deletion request.14
The next step required the user to upload any eligible digital
music to the "Cloud Locker," so that the digital music was no
longer located on the user's computer." After the upload process,
the digital music was once again verified for eligibility, and then
stored in the Cloud Locker. 6 The users were then able to store and
stream the digital music for personal use or sell it on ReDigi's

9. Id. at 645.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id. But, the application cannot detect copies stored in other locations or
devices. Id.
13. ReDigi, 934 F. Supp. 2d at 645.
14. Id.
15. Id. ReDigi argued that the uploading process migrates a user's file
"from the user's computer to the Cloud Locker so that data does not exist in two
places at any one time." Id. Capitol argued that the uploading process
'necessarily involves copying' a file from the user's computer to the Cloud
Locker." Id. at 646.
16. Id. at 646.
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marketplace." "Ifthe user sold the digital music, the user's access
to the digital music was terminated and transferred to the new
owner at the time of purchase."" "The new owner could then store
the music in the Cloud Locker, sell it, stream it, or download it to a
personal computer or other devices.""
Users only bought music through a system of credits, which
were purchased from ReDigi or acquired through sales of digital
music in the ReDigi marketplace.20 Credits could only be used to
purchase music on ReDigi's marketplace and could not be
exchanged for real money. 2' ReDigi earned a 60% fee on the sale
price of every music item purchased through credits, another 20%
of the sale price was given to the seller, and 20% went to an
"escrow" fund for the artist.2 2
B. ProceduralHistory
Capitol sued ReDigi in the District Court of the Southern
District of New York for copyright infringement under the
Copyright Act on January 6, 2012.23
Capitol sought both
preliminary and permanent injunctions against ReDigi, but the
District Court denied Capitol's motion for a preliminary injunction
because Capitol failed to establish irreparable harm. 24 Both
Capitol's motion for a preliminary injunction and motion for a
permanent injunction were denied.25 Capitol filed a motion for
partial summary judgment on the direct and secondary
infringement claims on July 20, 2012; on the same day, ReDigi
filed its cross-motion for summary judgment and raised the
affirmative defenses of fair use and first sale.26

17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.

Id.
Id.
ReDigi, 934 F. Supp. 2d at 646.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 646-647.
Id at 647.
ReDigi, 934 F. Supp. 2d at 647.
Id.
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III. LEGAL ANALYSIS

The District Court addressed Capitol's motion for partial
summary judgment on copyright infringement in three sections:
(1) whether Capitol owned a valid copyright and ReDigi's website
violated one of Capitol's exclusive rights, (2) whether ReDigi had
a fair use or first sale defense to excuse the infringement, and (3)
whether ReDigi was liable for direct and secondary infringement.2 7
A. Copyright Infringement
The District Court held that both the sale of digital music files
on ReDigi's website and ReDigi's technology violated Capitol's
exclusive rights in its copyrighted works.28 To state a copyright
infringement claim, a Plaintiff must show that it owned a valid
copyright in the work and that the Defendant violated one or more
of the exclusive rights granted to copyright holders.29 It was
undisputed that Capitol owned a valid copyright in the works at
issue." "It [was] also undisputed that Capitol did not approve of
the reproduction or distribution of the copyrighted works on
ReDigi's website."" Courts have held that "the unauthorized
duplication of digital music files over the Internet infringes a
copyright owner's exclusive right to reproduce."32 However, at
issue here was "whether the unauthorized transfer of a digital
music file over the Internet" constituted reproduction and
distribution within the meaning of the Copyright Act."
The District Court noted that ReDigi did not contest that
distribution occurred on its website, but instead raised the fair use
and first sale defenses as protection.34 With regard to the
reproduction right, the District Court looked to the plain text of the
27. Id. at 648.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. ReDigi, 934 F. Supp. 2d at 648.
32. Id. (citing A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1014 (9th
Cir. 2001)).
33. Id.
34. Id. at 651.
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Copyright Act, and determined that "reproduction occurs when a
copyrighted work is fixed in a new material object.""3 In addition,
other court decisions involving peer-to-peer file-sharing systems
have found that when a user downloaded a digital music file to a
hard disk, the file was "reproduced" within the meaning of the
Copyright Act.36 The District Court concluded that "it is the
creation of a new material object and not an additional material
object that defines the reproduction right[s]."3 7 Since it is
"impossible that the same 'material object' can be transferred over
the Internet," the transfer of a file over the Internet results in the
creation of a new material object on a different computer.
Ultimately, the District Court held that the sale of digital music
files on ReDigi's website infringed on Capitol's exclusive
distribution and reproduction rights, but infringement of Capitol's
display and performance rights could not be determined from the
record."
B. Affirmative Defenses
After finding that the sale of digital music files on ReDigi's
website infringed on Capitol's reproduction and distribution rights,

35. Id. at 648.
36. Id. at 649 (citing London-Sire Records, Inc. v. John Doe 1, 542 F. Supp.
2d 153, 171 (D. Mass. 2008)). The District Court based this assumption on its
interpretation of London-Sire Records, a case that dealt with infringement on
peer-to-peer file-sharing systems. Id There the court defined the portion of the
hard disk in which the file would be embodied after the transfer as a
"phonorecord" within the meaning of the Copyright Act and differentiated it
from the digital music file. Id. When a user on a peer-to-peer network
downloads a song from another user, a digital sequence is magnetically encoded
on a segment of the users hard disk, which can be used to reproduce the sound
recording. Id. (citing London-Sire Records, 542 F. Supp. 2d at 171). "The
electronic file (or, perhaps more accurately, the appropriate segment of the hard
disk) is therefore a "phonorecord" within the meaning of the statute." Id.
(quoting London-Sire Records, 542 F. Supp. 2d at 171).
37. ReDigi, 934 F. Supp. 2d at 650.
38. Id. (citing London-Sire Records, 542 F. Supp. 2d at 171).
39. Id. at 652.
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the District Court determined whether the fair use and first sale
defenses could negate ReDigi's liability for infringement.40
1. Fair Use
The District Court concluded that ReDigi's reproduction and
distribution of Capitol's works was not fair use. 4' The test used by
the District Court for fair use was "whether the copyright law's
goal of 'promot[ing] the Progress of Science and useful Arts'
would be better served by allowing the use than by preventing
it." 42 The use of the copyrighted work without consent is
permitted for purposes, such as "criticism, comment, news
reporting, teaching, scholarship, or research." 43 The District Court
examined the four statutory factors:
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including
whether such use is of a commercial nature or is for
nonprofit educational purposes; (2) the nature of the
copyrighted work; (3) the amount and substantiality
of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted
work as a whole; and (4) the effect of the use upon
the potential market for or value of the copyrighted
work."
Capitol asserted that "uploading to and downloading from the
Cloud Locker incident to sale fall outside the ... fair use

[defense] ."45 The District Court found that all four factors weighed
unquestionably in favor of Capitol. 46 Reviewing the first factor,
the District Court observed that ReDigi used the work for
commercial purposes and directly profited from sales.4 7
Furthermore, the use of ReDigi's website to upload and download
40. Id.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.

Id. at 653.
Id. at 652-653.
ReDigi, 934 F. Supp. 2d at 653 (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 107).
Id. (citing 17 U.S.C. § 107).
Id.
Id.
Id
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digital music did not add something new to transform the
copyrighted work.48 Under the second factor, the nature of the
copyrighted digital sound recordings was creative, much different
from the factual nature of the works listed as permissive fair use.49
The third factor weighed against the application of fair use because
the copyrighted works were transferred in their entirety." Finally,
the District Court noted that ReDigi's sales were likely to undercut
"the market for the copyrighted works because the goods sold in
the secondary market, which were sold for a lower price, were
indistinguishable from those sold in the primary market."" The
District Court concluded that there was no fair use defense because
"ReDigi facilitate[d] and profit[ed] from the sale of copyrighted
commercial recordings, transferred in their entirety, with a likely
detrimental impact on the primary market for these goods."52
2. FirstSale
The District Court held that the first sale defense did not allow
ReDigi's reproduction and distribution of Capitol's works."
Pursuant to the first sale doctrine:
Notwithstanding the provision of section 106(3), the
owner of a particular copy or phonorecord lawfully
made... or any person authorized by such owner, is
entitled, without the authority of the copyright
owner, to sell or otherwise dispose of the possession
of that copy or phonorecord.5 4
ReDigi asserted that the sale of lawfully purchased, eligible
digital music on its website was protected by the first sale
48. Id.
49. ReDigi, 934 F. Supp. 2d at 654.
50. Id.

51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 656.
54. Id. at 654 (citing 17 U.S.C. § 109). Section 106(3) lays out the exclusive
right of a copyright owner to distribute copies or phonorecords. See 17 U.S.C. §
106(3).
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doctrine." The District Court started by stating that the first sale
doctrine was limited to assertions of the distribution right and did
The District Court
not apply to the reproduction right.5 6
determined that when the user used ReDigi to upload the digital
music file, the lawful owner produced a new unlawful
reproduction on the ReDigi server." Thus, the first sale doctrine
did not protect ReDigi's infringement of Capitol's distribution
right because "as an unlawful reproduction, a digital music file
sold on ReDigi is not 'lawfully made.""' The District Court
reasoned that because ReDigi's service violated Capitol's
reproduction right by creating a new copy of the digital music file,
the first sale defense did not apply to ReDigi's infringement.5 9
The District Court then looked to the plain language to
determine that the statute "applies to the lawful owner's
'particular' phonorecord, a phonorecord that by definition cannot
be uploaded and sold on ReDigi's website." 60 The District Court
also looked at the Digital Millennium Copyright Act ("DMCA")
Report, in which the United States Copyright Office ("USCO")
explicitly expressed concerns with the extension of the first sale
doctrine to the distribution of digital works because "time, space,
effort and cost no longer act as barriers to the movement of
copies."' The digital copy, the "used" copy, is just as desirable as
the "new" copy of the same work, which may undercut the market
for copyright owners.62 The District Court acknowledged that the
lawful owner's sale of the particular phonorecord was still
protected with required physical limitations: the sale of the digital
music through the sale of the "computer hard disk, iPod, or other
55. ReDigi, 934 F. Supp. 2d at 655.
56. Id. "As an initial matter, it should be noted that the [first sale] defense
is, by its own terms, limited to assertions of the distribution right." Id.
(emphasis in original) (citing 17 U.S.C. § 109).
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. ReDigi, 934 F. Supp. 2d at 656 (citing U.S. Copyright Office, Digital
Millennium Act (DMCA), Section 104 Report 82-83 (Aug. 2001), available at
http://www.copyright.gov/reports/studies/dmca/sec-104-report-vol-1.pdf).
62. Id.
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memory device onto which the file was originally downloaded."6 3
Accordingly, the District Court held that "the first sale defense
does not permit sales of digital music on ReDigi's website.""
C. Liability
For direct liability, a defendant must engage in "volitional
conduct" that "causes" the reproduction or distribution of the
copyrighted work.65 ReDigi's service allowed the sale of digital
music on its website only if the works were copyrighted, most
notably protected music purchased from iTunes.66 The District
Court concluded that ReDigi's conduct, by providing the
infrastructure for the sale of copyrighted works, resulted in active
participation in the process of copyright infringement and not mere
passive conduct as a provider for infringing activities.67
A defendant is secondarily liable under contributory
infringement, if the defendant has actual or constructive
"knowledge of the infringing activity, induces, causes or
materially contributes to the infringing conduct of another.""
However, if the product is "capable of substantial noninfringing
uses," the defendant will not be liable even if there is a material
contribution.69 The District Court noted that ReDigi was aware of
its users' infringement and should have known that its services
would encourage infringement.70 The District Court also found
that ReDigi materially contributed to its users' infringement
because "ReDigi's service was the hub and heart of its users'
infringing activity.""
63. Id.
6 4. Id.
65. Id.; see Cartoon Network LP v. CSC Holdings, Inc., 536 F.3d 121, 131
(2d Cir. 2008).
66. Id. at 657.
67. ReDigi, 934 F. Supp. 2d at 657.
68. Id. at 658; see, e.g., Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545
U.S. 913, 930 (2005).
69. Id. at 658; see Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464
U.S. 417,442 (1984).
70. Id. at 659.
7 1. Id.
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A defendant is secondarily liable under vicarious infringement,
if the defendant has a "direct financial interest" and has "the right
and ability to supervise" the infringing activity.7 2 The District
Court found that ReDigi exercised control over the website and
sales, from which it financially benefitted.73 Consequently, the
District Court held ReDigi liable for direct infringement as well as
secondary infringement, including contributory and vicarious
liability, for violating Capitol's exclusive distribution and
reproduction rights.74
IV. FUTURE IMPLICATIONS
The District Court in ReDigi limits the expansion of the first sale
doctrine to digital copyrighted works through its observation that
any transfer of digital music over the Internet requires the creation
of a new copy."
When the user uploaded digital music to
ReDigi's Cloud Locker for sale or personal use, that person
produced a new unlawful reproduction on the ReDigi server.76 As
the District Court stated, "put simply, ReDigi, by virtue of its
design, is incapable of compliance with the law."" However,
"ReDigi 1.0" has changed its business model so that it now
complies with the District Court's ruling by circumventing its
reasoning. "ReDigi 2.0" allows a user to purchase digital music
from iTunes and download the original to the ReDigi Cloud
Locker as opposed to the user's personal computer." If the user
chooses to sell the original copy, the user does not create an
unlawful reproduction of the original by uploading it to the ReDigi
Cloud Locker, allowing the application of the first-sale doctrine. It
72. Id. at 660; see, e.g., Gershwin Publ'g Corp. v. Columbia Artists Mgmt.,
Inc., 443 F.2d 1159, 1162 (2d Cir. 1971).
73. ReDigi, 934 F. Supp. 2d at 660.
74. Id. at 660-661.
75. Id. at 649.
76. Id. at 651.
77. Id. at 659.
78. Matt Peckham, ReDigi CEO Says the Court Just Snatched Away Your
Right to Resell What You Legally Own, TIME TECH (Apr. 25, 2013),
http://techland.time.com/2013/04/25/redigi-ceo-says-the-court-just-snatchedaway-your-right-to-resell-what-you-legally-own.
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would seem that the District Court in ReDigi gave too much
significance to the technicalities of transmitting digital music over
the Internet than to the practicalities of its decision.
The District Court looked to the DMCA 2001 Report ("the
Report"), which evaluated the expansion of the first sale doctrine
to digital files and advised against the doctrine's expansion,
without giving more consideration to current development in
business, technology, and the law.79 The primary concerns at, the
time appeared to be the adverse effect on the market and the
potential for exploitation." Withholding the expansion of the
doctrine was recommended because of the adverse economic
impact and lack of control over digital content on the Internet."
The USCO emphasized the drastic difference between used
physical copies, which degrade over time, and used digital copies,
which are identical and retain their quality.82 Because the used
digital copy is as desirable as a new copy, the concern was that
used digital copies would directly compete with new digital copies
over the Internet to the detriment of the copyright owner.83
Used copies are, in fact, increasingly, directly competing with
new copies in today's digital world. Illegal pirating and peer-topeer sharing activities have changed the market landscape. These
activities are a clear calling for Congress to consider the
regulation, rather than the prohibition, of the sale of used digital
copies and to provide guidance for the application of the first sale
doctrine to digital music. The expansion of the first sale doctrine
to digital music is arguably a moot point since the rapid change in
technology and consumer habits make it impossible to predict the
79. ReDigi, 934 F. Supp. 2d at 655-656; U.S. Copyright Office, Digital
Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA), Section 104 Report 82-83 (Aug. 2001),
available at http://www.copyright.gov/reports/studies/dmca/sec-104-report-vol1.pdf.
80. U.S. Copyright Office, Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA),
Section 104 Report 82-84 (Aug. 2001).
8 1. Id.
82. Id. at 82-83.
83. Id. "Time, space, effort and cost no longer act as barriers to the
movement of copies, since digital copies can be transmitted nearly
instantaneously anywhere in the world with minimal effort and negligent cost."
Id.
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future of this issue. For example, music streaming services allow
subscribers to listen to digital music for a monthly fee without
purchasing or downloading music. Although the development of
music streaming services may reduce the consumer market for
digital music ownership, ownership will continue because it
guarantees access to and control of the digital music content.
Thus, the restrictions on the application of the first sale doctrine to
digital music are still a valid concern for consumers.
The rationale for the first sale doctrine is based in the commonlaw principle that prevents the copyright owner from restraining
the free alienability of tangible property, in the absence of clear
congressional intent to abrogate this principle.84 In the Report, an
argument is made that the distinction between tangible and
intangible property is critical to the rationale." However, the
nature of tangible and intangible property, from an economic point
of view in today's commercial sale of digital content, is often
indistinguishable. The Report concluded that to recommend a
broadened scope of the first sale doctrine, there has to be a need
for change that outweighs the concerns of the proposed
expansion."
One recent change is the evolution of the Internet into a
marketplace for goods that has increased international commerce
for digital content, as evidenced by this case. ReDigi is a company
that has promoted its "pre-owned" marketplace for digital music
files abroad. As such, looking to foreign court decisions that have
dealt with this particular issue is useful guidance. The European
Court of Justice ("ECJ") dealt with the identical issue of "whether
the right to distribute a copy... is exhausted when the acquirer has
made the copy with the rightholder's consent by downloading the
program from the internet onto a data carrier."" The ECJ held that
84. Id. at 86.

85. Id.
86. U.S. Copyright Office, Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA),
Section 104 Report 97 (Aug. 2001).
87. UsedSoft GmbH v. Oracle International Corp., Case C-128/11, 2012
E.C.R. 19, 1 1. In UsedSoft GmbH, Oracle International Corp. ("Oracle") a
computer software developer distributed its software products through the
Internet onto the purchaser's computer. Id. at 2. Oracle's license agreement
provided for use of the software product for an unlimited period of time in
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the download of a program for a payment constituted first sale of a
program." The analysis focused on the classification of the license
in question as a sale, so that the term "sale" was given broad
interpretation to include a grant of the right to use a copy for an
unlimited period of time in return for a payment corresponding to
the economic value of that copy.89 The ECJ went a step further by
holding that in the event of a resale of a digital copy acquired by
the first user for an unlimited period of time in return for a
payment corresponding to the economic value of that copy, the
second user that acquires the copy and "any subsequent acquirer of
it, will be able to rely on the exhaustion of the distribution right..."
as long as the former copies are rendered unusable at the time of
resale.9 0
This decision was also noteworthy because it emphasized the
economic value of the program regardless of whether the program
was made available to the customer as intangible property by
means of a download on the Internet or as tangible property by
means of a material medium such as a CD. The ECJ noted, "from
an economic point of view, the sale... [by] a CD-ROM or DVD
and the sale... by downloading from the Internet are similar. The
online transmission method is the functional equivalent of the
supply of a material medium."9' The ECJ, unlike the District
Court in ReDigi, considered the online transmission method as the
simple equivalent of a material medium and was not entrenched in
the technicalities of the method. Furthermore, the ECJ emphasized
the economic value that makes tangible and intangible property, in
the context of digital content, indistinguishable. The District Court
in ReDigi disregarded the fact that ReDigi's application deleted or
rendered the original user's copy unusable. Thus, for all practical
purposes, it would be considered a true transfer of the digital
music file.
exchange for a payment. Id. at
3. UsedSoft GmbH ("UsedSoft") resold
"used" software licenses it obtained from the original purchaser to its customers.
Id. at 1 4. Customers who purchased licenses for additional users downloaded
the software to the main memory of the users' computers. Id
88. Id. at 1.
89. Id. at 7.
90. Id. at 8.
91. Id. at 12.
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In Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., the US Supreme Court
recently confronted the issue of grey market goods and
emphasized the important role of the first sale doctrine in
American copyright law.92 The Supreme Court held that the first
sale doctrine applies to copies of a copyrighted work lawfully
made abroad, but to arrive at its decision, the Supreme Court had
to interpret the words "lawfully made under this title."93 In the
analysis, the present language of the first sale defense §109(a) was
compared with the language of its immediate predecessor.94 The
Supreme Court deduced that the "language of the former version
referred to those who are not owners of a copy, but mere
possessors who 'lawfully obtained' a copy," while "[t]he present
version covers only those who are owners of a 'lawfully made'
copy."" The Supreme Court concluded that owners of a copy
have first sale protection, but lessees and bailees with mere
possession of a copy do not receive first sale protection." This
broad interpretation of the first sale doctrine by the Supreme Court
would suggest a movement towards the further expansion of the
first sale doctrine.
With the growing presence of digital content and the
development of more online marketplaces for such content,
Congress and the courts are bound to confront the issue of the first
sale doctrine's expansion to digital content in the near future. The
courts' reaction to this push for expansion may be to continue to
limit the first sale defense for digital music until Congress
provides guidance.
V. CONCLUSION
The United States District Court of the Southern District of New
York granted Capitol's motion for partial summary judgment and

92. Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 1351 (2013).
93. Kirtsaeng, 133 S. Ct. 1351, 1355-56 (2013).
94. Id. at 1360-61.
95. Id. "[N]othing in this Act shall be deemed to forbid, prevent, or restrict
the transfer of any copy of a copyrighted work the possession of which has been
lawfully obtained." Id. (quoting Copyright Act of 1909, §41, 35 Stat. 1084).
96. Id. at 1361.
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denied ReDigi's motion for summary judgment.9 7 The District
Court held that there was direct infringement and secondary
infringement, including contributory and vicarious liability.98 The
District Court held that the sale of digital music on ReDigi's
website and ReDigi's technology violated Capitol's exclusive
rights because the transfer over the Internet necessarily results in
the creation of a new material object." Because transmission over
the Internet requires the creation of a new material object, the copy
in question is an unlawful reproduction of the original; thus, the
first sale defense did not apply to ReDigi's infringement."oo By not
broadening the scope of the first sale defense to digital music, the
District Court gave deference to "the constitutional authority and
the institutional ability" of Congress to provide guidance for
"major technological innovations [that] alter the market of
copyrighted materials.""' Congress has made it clear that the need
for change must outweigh the concerns for expanding the first sale
defense to digital files.'02 Consequently, the courts will continue to
find ways of limiting the expansion of the first sale defense to
digital files when they confront the issue in the future until
Congress provides a legislative solution.
JorgeAnguiano*

97. ReDigi, 934 F. Supp. 2d at 648.
98. Id. at 660-661.
99. Id. at 648, 649-650 (citing London-Sire Records, 542 F. Supp. 2d at
171).
100. Id. at 655.
101. Id. at 660 (quoting Sony Corp. ofAm., 464 U.S. at 431).
102. U.S. Copyright Office, Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA),
Section 104 Report 97 (Aug. 2001).
* J.D. Candidate 2014, DePaul University College of Law; B.A. 2010,
Northwestern University. I would like to thank Professor Margit Livingston for
her valuable guidance and feedback.
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